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Abstract
The Bhagavadgītā, part of the sixth book of the Hindu epic TheMahābhārata, offers a
practical approach to mokṣa, or liberation, and freedom from saṃsāra, or the cycle of
death and rebirth. According to the approach, known as karmayoga (‘the yoga of
action’), salvation results from attention to duty and the recognition of past acts that
inform the present and will direct the future. In the Bhagavadgītā, Kṛṣṇa advocates
selfless action as the ideal path to realizing the truth about oneself as well as the
ultimate reality. Kṛṣṇa proclaims that humans have rights only to actions and not to
their results, whether good or bad (2.47). Therefore, humans should not desire any
results whatsoever. The prisoner’s dilemma is a fictional story that shows why indi-
viduals who seek only their personal benefit meet worse outcomes than those possible
by cooperating with others. The dilemma provides an effective, albeit often overlooked,
method for studying the Hindu principle of niṣkāmakarma (‘desireless action’) that is
arguably the central teaching of the Bhagavadgītā. In the context of the prisoner’s
dilemma, a prisoner who wants to uphold niṣkāmakarma may choose one of two
decision-making strategies: to be indifferent and leave the decision to chance or to
either pursue the common good or the other person’s benefit instead of his or her own.
Assuming that followers of niṣkāmakarma can be goal-oriented, the second strategy is
more appropriate than the first, as long as one pursues unselfish goals and remains both
indifferent and uncommitted to personal benefit.
Keywords Niṣkāmakarma . The prisoner’s dilemma . Desireless action . Benefit .
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Introduction
This paper aims to shed new light on the topic of niṣkāmakarma (‘desireless action’) in
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experiment known as the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. The dilemma shows why two
completely rational individuals might not cooperate even when doing so appears to
be in their best interests. The dilemma provides a well-formulated, theoretical game
context for developing an understanding of niṣkāmakarma. In the context of the
prisoner’s dilemma, a prisoner who wants to uphold the principle should choose one
of two decision-making strategies: to pursue the common good or to pursue the other
person’s benefit instead of his or her own. Assuming that followers of niṣkāmakarma
can be goal-oriented, the first strategy is no less appropriate than the second, as long as
one remains both indifferent and uncommitted to personal benefit.
However, things become more complicated when the notion of liberation in the
Bhagavadgītā (hereafter The Gītā) is considered. The Gītā advises human beings to
seek liberation (mokṣa) as the final goal of life (2.64–66, 2.70–72, 4.19–23, 6.15, 6.36,
17.25). One may wonder whether the concern for liberation contradicts selflessness and
desirelessness: Why would one be concerned about liberation unless one thinks of
oneself as something whose liberation is desirable? The Gītā does not provide a
straightforward answer to this question. Instead, it (3.20, 3.25, 18.5–7) argues that
contributing to the common good dutifully and selflessly is a proper way to attain
liberation (Sreekumar 2012, pp. 277–278, pp. 308–310). From this the following
dilemma arises, one should strive for liberation while becoming liberated from self-
interested strivings. Here, the notion of niṣkāmakarma comes in, simultaneously
mitigating and exacerbating the dilemma: The way to liberation is through desireless
action. How should such an ambiguous notion as desireless action be understood?
As I elaborate in this paper, the new viewpoint provided by the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’
can enhance current understandings of selflessness and desirelessness, as well as fill a
gap in research on the principle of niṣkāmakarma. First, the prisoner’s dilemma
presents and illuminates the two basic strategies of decision-making: focusing on
self-interest versus pursuing the greater good. Moreover, the prisoner’s dilemma
suggests that those strategies do not necessarily go hand in hand, which is exactly
what Kṛṣṇa (indirectly) points out in the Bhagavadgītā when he warns against acting
for personal gain (2.47–48, 6.1). Most importantly, the prisoner’s dilemma reveals the
rationality of striving to advance the common good, which is a prominent teaching in
the Bhagavadgītā (3.19–20, 3.25) and a move away from self-interest. Before elabo-
rating upon the merits of the viewpoint, however, I make some general remarks on the
concept of niṣkāmakarma and discuss a philosophically relevant aspect of translation
related to the outcomes of desireless action.
The Concept of Niṣkāmakarma
The Bhagavadgītā, part of the sixth book of the Hindu epic The Mahābhārata
(common practice), offers a practical approach to mokṣa, or liberation, and freedom
from saṃsāra, or the cycle of death and rebirth. According to the approach, known as
karmayoga (‘the yoga of action’), salvation results from attention to duty and the
recognition of past acts that inform the present and will direct the future (Singh 1991, p.
107). In the Gītā, Kṛṣṇa advocates selfless action as the ideal path to realizing the truth
about oneself as well as the ultimate reality. According to Kṛṣṇa, action taken without
self-centered expectations or consideration of outcomes tends to purify one’s mind.
T. Lehtonen
Moreover, action without desire gradually makes an individual fit to see the value of
mind control and the benefits of renouncing the action itself (2.41, 2.48–49, 6.1–4, 6.7,
6.24–27). The benefits of such renunciation essentially include liberation from an
attachment to worldly bonds and suffering.
The central tenet of the karmayoga path to liberation is the principle of
niṣkāmakarma. Niṣkāmakarma refers to an action performed without any expectation
of reward or result whatsoever. The Bhagavadgītā calls that idea ‘inaction in action and
action in inaction’ (4.18). Even if the term does not appear in the Bhagavadgītā itself
(Fowler 2012, p. xliii–iv), niṣkāmakarma is arguably the central teaching of the text
(Chakraborty 1996, 1998). At the text level, this argument is based on verse 18.6:
But having relinquished [all] attachment and [actions’] fruits, even these actions
should be performed—this is My decided ultimate (uttama) conviction (mata), O
son-of-Prithā (Feuerstein 2014, 299).
However, one must be on guard against uncritically adopting the term niṣkāmakarma as
shorthand for the central teaching of the Bhagavadgītā. The danger lies, first, in the fact that
kāma is not as broad in its semantic signification as the English desire. Although there can be
pure, Sattvic ‘desires’ such as the desire for liberation (18.26, 18.30), it would not usually be
termed kāma by pre-modern Sanskrit authors (i.e., mumukṣā is not kāma). Moreover, the
Bhagavadgītā is in many ways a difficult document to interpret, not least because it deals
with a wide variety of topics that relate not only to ethics but also to metaphysics,
epistemology, eschatology, soteriology, yogic technique, and so on (Sreekumar 2012, pp.
279–280). Therefore, it remains open to question—and depends on the point of view—what
the central teaching of the Bhagavadgītā is.
It is well known that a basic belief in Hinduism is the law of karma or action—
briefly, that every good thought, word, or deed begets a similarly good reaction in this
or in a subsequent life and, by the same token, that every unkind thought or evil deed
ultimately comes back to harm the actor in this life or the next. In traditional thought,
karma consists of three stages. First, prārabdha karma refers to the accumulated effects
of past deeds that one experiences in his or her present life. Second, sañcitakarma
refers to acts performed either in this life or in a previous one but that have not yet
begun to bear fruit. Third and last, āgāmikarma refers to acts performed in this life, the
results of which are yet to come. Niṣkāmakarma is considered to be the ideal kind of
karma, for it is obtainable only by not seeking any reward (Singh 1991, p. 120).
Different Interpretations of Niṣkāmakarma
In the second chapter of the Bhagavadgītā, Kṛṣṇa proclaims that humans have rights
only to actions and not to their results, whether good or bad (2.47–48). Therefore, they
should not desire any results. Of utmost importance in such thinking is that humans are
not doomed to idleness or inactivity but instead should act according to the require-
ments of morality and decency. At the same time, they are not entitled to the results of
their actions and, as such, should not be selfishly concerned about them. Although
admirable to perform good deeds and participate in well-intentioned activities, the
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outcomes of those actions should not be associated with their actors. Instead, according
to the Bhagavadgītā, the positive outcomes of actions should be understood to repre-
sent the common good (3.19–20, 3.25), which should be accessible to every member of
society. Thus, the outcomes of actions are not ultimately under the control of humans,
who are, after all, instruments of the becoming of the ultimate reality, often understood
as the fulfilment of God’s eternal designs (Bhagavadgītā 11.15–34; Singh 1991, p.
107). Thus, humans have the right to use the outcomes of their actions for good, but
they do not own those outcomes.
When reading Kṛṣṇa’s teaching—in short, that people should not desire results—
with sensitivity to philosophy, the advice seems problematic and strange, for an action
and its results are internally related. For example, if I manage to open a window, which
can be opened only by my action, then the window’s being open is directly due to my
action (Kim 1993, p. 26).
Of course, interpretations of Kṛṣṇa’s meaning are inevitably subject to the loose and
ambiguous use of language in translation. In the Bhagavadgītā (2.47), the Sanskrit term for
result is phala, or ‘fruit’, which many translators replace with either ‘result’ or ‘reward’. In
that context, the term reward relates to the idea of the universalmoral bookkeeping of karmic
merits as the basis for rewards. Clearly, the Bhagavadgītā thus distinguishes an action from
its outcomes, whether those outcomes are called ‘results’, ‘fruit’, or ‘rewards’. According to
the Bhagavadgītā, performing a deed is therefore separate from its result. Nevertheless, a
possible interpretation is that the Bhagavadgītā, in using the term phala vaguely, conflates
the results of an action with its consequences. Indeed, along with its results, an action can
have intended or unintended consequences. Whereas the relationship between an action and
its result is intrinsic, the relationship between an action and its consequences is extrinsic or
causal (von Wright 1963; Raz 1975).
In an elaboration upon the difference between the results and consequences of an
action, Georg Henrik von Wright (1963, p. 39) has explained:
By the result of an act we can understand either the change corresponding to this
act or alternatively the end-state [. . .] of this change. Thus by the result of the act
of opening a certain window we can understand either the fact that the window is
opening (changes from closed to open) or the fact that it is open. On either way of
understanding the notion of a result of action the tie between the act and its result
is intrinsic. [. . .]. Unlike the relation between an act and its result the relation
between an act and its consequences is extrinsic (causal).
To reveal how complex the issue can be, von Wright has added that
One and the same change or state of affairs can be both the result and a
consequence of an action. What makes it the one or the other depends upon the
agent’s intention in acting and upon other circumstances. (p. 40)
According to von Wright’s analysis, the agent’s intention determines whether a state of
affairs is the result or the consequence of an action. The consequences of opening a
window can include fresh air, and a fly coming into the room. Fresh air is often an
intended consequence, whereas a fly is more likely an unintended one. Moreover, one
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can reinterpret opening a window as the act of letting in fresh air, in which case fresh air
is the result of the act.
Based on those initial considerations, Kṛṣṇa’s advice that people should not desire
any results from their actions can be interpreted in different ways (Sreekumar 2012, p.
302). One might interpret it as tongue in cheek, as Kṛṣṇa’s advising people to take
action but to avoid exerting much effort in the process. That interpretation clearly
differs from one renouncing action or, somewhat differently, endorsing inaction
(Chakrabarti 1983). Could the interpretation—that people should perform deeds with-
out striving or taking the trouble to make those deeds matter—be correct? There is no
reason to think so, for Kṛṣṇa does not also advise carelessness or sluggishness or
leaving deeds unfinished. Instead, he suggests focusing not on personal benefits as
outcomes of actions but on duties and the common good, as I soon demonstrate.
Textual evidence for the latter interpretation abounds, as the following examples show:
In action alone is your rightful-interest (adhikāra), never in [its] fruit. Let not
your motive be the fruit of action; nor let your attachment be to inaction
(akarman). Steadfast in Yoga, perform actions abandoning attachment, O
Dhanamjaya, [always] remaining the same in success and failure. Yoga is called
equanimity. (2.47–48; Feuerstein 2014, 107, 109)
Renouncing all actions in Me, with the mind [turned toward] the basis-of-self,
[and] having become without hope, without [the sense of] “mine,” [with your]
fever-of-anxiety departed—fight! (3.30; Feuerstein 2014, 129)
[He who is] yoked, having relinquished the fruit of action, attains ultimate peace.
The unyoked [individual], acting from desire and attached to the fruit [of action],
is bound [by karma] (5.12; Feuerstein 2014, 151)
He who performs the action to be done, regardless of action’s fruit, is a renouncer
and a yogin; not [so is he who is] without the [sacrificial] fire and is inactive. (6.1;
Feuerstein 2014, 157)
[When] he performs necessary action that is indeed to be done, O Arjuna, and by
relinquishing attachment and the fruit [of one’s action]—the relinquishment is
deemed [to be] sattva-natured. (18.9; Feuerstein 2014, 301)
Moreover, Kṛṣṇa proclaims that performing actions without entangling them with
desires will afford release from the chains of rebirth (Bhagavadgītā 2.51; 4.18–20).
From an alternative perspective, Brodbeck (2004, pp. 84, 89, 92–93, 95, 98, 100)
has sharply criticized any attempts to interpret Kṛṣṇa’s advice positively and claimed
instead that Kṛṣṇa is bluffing. According to Brodbeck, Kṛṣṇa takes a stance advocating
determinism: that is, the view that all which happens occurs necessarily and that
nothing may happen in any other way. With that stance, he fools Arjuna, the com-
mander of the Pandava army, into believing that he can and should decide to fight, even
if such a decision is impossible; after all, Arjuna is not free to choose but acts according
to the force of destiny. In Brodbeck’s view, Kṛṣṇa cleverly does not try to convince
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Arjuna of the reality of determinism but instead appeals to Arjuna’s duties as a soldier.
However, that interpretation, though intriguing, is unconvincing, as well as controver-
sial, given the Bhagavadgītā’s general position on desire and liberation. If everything,
including opinions and intentions, is determined, then being concerned about changing
oneself would be as pointless as being concerned about the impossibility of such
change. Whereas such self-change, if possible, would be highly advisable, if it is
impossible, then entertaining it is pointless. At the same time, if you are determined
either to entertain the thought of such change or to fear the consequences of not
changing, then you cannot but consider changing. However, textual evidence justifying
the assumption that the Bhagavadgītā advocates such a complex perspective on desires
and liberation is thin and ambiguous (see 3.5, 18.58–60).
It seems more plausible, as several other authors have pointed out, to interpret
Kṛṣṇa’s advice to mean that people should perform deeds out of a sense of duty, not
for self-centered gain (Bhagavadgītā 3.19; 18.9). This interpretation conveys a certain
idea of humbleness and serenity: humans should not take the outcomes of their actions
as rights or something that they are entitled to but should accept positive outcomes as
(undeserved) gifts and should not complain about negative outcomes. Even if the Gītā
thus advises not focusing on personal benefit, some deeds—for example, ones related
to fulfilling basic physical needs such as eating and sleeping—are necessarily self-
centered, such that performing them inevitably responds to the self. Arguably, in
fulfilling those basic needs, a healthy self-interest is necessary and thus does not
contradict duty.
Regarding the Bhagavadgītā’s concept of the person, ātman (‘the true, inmost
self’)—characterized in mahāvākyas, or the great sayings of the Upaniṣads, to be
identical with Brahman or the ultimate reality—is not the doer of deeds but an observer
and adviser similar to Kṛṣṇa, the charioteer to Prince Arjuna. In the Bhagavadgītā,
Arjuna, shocked at the thought of fighting his Kaurava relatives, hesitates before the
battle at Kurukshetra (1.26–2.9). Although Arjuna orders his charioteer to withdraw,
Kṛṣṇa urges Arjuna to ready himself for battle and to regard pleasure and pain, gain and
loss, and victory and failure all as one and the same. Only when Arjuna has renounced
interest in the fruits of his actions does he find true peace (2.14–38). Traditionally,
readers have understood Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna’s discussion to imply that the doer of deeds
is jīva, or the empirical or seeming self, equipped with a mind and body. Moreover,
according to the Bhagavadgītā, salvation ultimately derives from the recognition that
the true self is not jīva, the doer, and thus that the true self does not reap the fruits of
action, either (2.47). Whereas the true or transcendental (or second order) self, ātman, is
concerned with fulfilling moral duties (2.31–39) and with observing and evaluating the
actions of the empirical self, the empirical self is concerned with obtaining benefits and
the results of actions (2.2–8). Consequently, salvation is not only an ethical topic in the
Bhagavadgītā but also a serious onto-epistemological one, for a true understanding of
the self and of ultimate reality is intrinsic to salvation.
In fewer words, the Bhagavadgītā teaches that people should fulfil their duties and
advance the common good, or lokasaṅgraha (‘the holding-together of the world’, ‘the
welfare of the world’, 3.19–20, 3.25). At the same time, they should understand that
ātman, or the inmost self, is not the doer of deeds but an observer and adviser. As
Indian social reformer and independence activist Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1936, 466) has
worded the matter:
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A man should not entertain the proud or desireful thought that “I shall bring about
lokasaṅgraha” [. . .]. A man has to bring about lokasaṅgraha merely as a duty.
To return to Kṛṣṇa’s advice that people should not desire results, von Wright has
provided the means for another interpretation, according to which individuals, when
acting, should focus on changes corresponding to the actions, not their ultimate effect.
A suitable metaphor for that interpretation is the Zen archery competition at which a
master advises his disciples to focus their attention on aiming, not on scoring (Herrigel
1999). Similarly, the controlled performance of a gymnastics routine is arguably more
important than the points given by a jury. In that context, the Western Aristotelian
distinction between doing and making (or between action and production) can be
illuminating. Gymnastics, as well as dance and music, are examples of Aristotelian
praksis (‘action’), the result of which is not separate from but included in the activity.
Making and producing, or poiesis, in turn, is an activity in which the result is separate
from the activity, as in house building and thesis writing (Nichomachean Ethics I.1,
1094a1–5, VI.4, 1140a1–24, VI.5, 1140b6–7, 1140b7; Aristotle 1999, 1, 88–89). By
extension, Kṛṣṇa’s advice can be interpreted to encourage concentration on doing or
performing and not the outcome or end-state of those activities. That solution,
however, is problematic, especially in the context of production, because it
diminishes the value of the result (e.g., profit) that is fundamental in, for
example, financial performance.
Situations in which one takes action without considering its outcomes include:
1. When one does not wait for anything related to acting but simply acts (e.g., out of
duty or gratitude);
2. When one is in a state of flow or so deeply immersed in an activity that he or she
performs an action without thinking about its results or consequences; and
3. When one acts like an automaton and does not know or understand what he or she
is doing.
The first two—not waiting for anything before acting and acting in a state of flow—are
more plausible interpretations of Kṛṣṇa’s advice, for he does not make any reference to
acting unconsciously.
A relevant but seemingly contradictory question is: In what way, and to what extent,
can niṣkāmakarma benefit agents? In answering that question, I should clarify that,
based on the foregoing analysis, desireless does not mean purposeless, indifferent, or
unintentional, but dutiful, conscientiously or obediently fulfilling one’s duty or being
motivated by duty instead of by the potential of reward. Moreover, because duty
implies obligation, fulfilling one’s duty is, by definition, obligatory and necessary. In
terms of psychological benefits, acting without desire can produce byproducts such as
freedom from stress, a relaxed performance and life with fewer disappointments, all
because expectations are not directed towards success or failure but towards the
fulfilment of duty. The potential risks of acting without desire, in turn, include
negligence, passivity, and too much relaxation.
Based on the aforesaid, Kṛṣṇa’s advice that people should not desire any results from
their actions should be interpreted either as an obligation to act out of duty and
unselfishly, for which a suitable motto might be ‘True love is giving, not receiving’,
or as the wisdom to concentrate on doing an activity, not on its outcome. At the same
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time, both interpretations are compatible and not exclusive; people can both act
altruistically and concentrate on performing activities.
In reference to the notion that niṣkāmakarma can be acquired only by renouncing it,
a relevant question is whether niṣkāmakarma is an ability or a disposition that can be
acquired. If the latter is true, then another question is whether niṣkāmakarma requires
or presupposes free will. One can have free will in at least three senses: as the necessary
condition for moral responsibility (McKenna and Pereboom 2016, p. 8), as the ability
to do other than what one has done (van Inwagen 2017) and as the ability to bring about
one’s characteristics, virtues and strengths by action (Kane 1996, p. 4). By extension,
three interpretations of niṣkāmakarma can be distinguished: the disposition of dutiful-
ness, the disposition to advance the common good and the disposition to follow the
second-order will, also known as the observer–adviser concept of the self. Based on
what I have shown, niṣkāmakarma requires acting either like a robot without consid-
ering the results of one’s actions or like a virtuous person who has developed a
character not oriented towards achieving the results of his or her actions. When so
understood, niṣkāmakarma requires free will, at least in the context of the third sense
(i.e., the ability to bring about one’s virtues and strengths). At the same time, by
emphasizing the importance of fulfilling one’s duties, niṣkāmakarma seems to uphold
the first sense of free will, for it would be pointless to exhort an automaton to fulfil its
duties and responsibilities. The principle of niṣkāmakarma also presupposes that, in
deeds and actions, one can focus on the results or on the performance and thereby do
otherwise than what one has done. Thus, all three meanings of free will are relevant to
and accessible in the concept of niṣkāmakarma.
Despite a plausible understanding of how to interpret Kṛṣṇa’s advice—that people
should not focus on results when engaging into action, which however does not rule out
the possibility of taking into consideration consequences—the prisoner’s dilemma
provides a means to introduce a fourth interpretation: to be indifferent when choosing
among a range of actions and to leave the decision to chance, fate, or providence
(Brodbeck 2004). Although that interpretation is doubtful, because it has a very thin
and ambiguous evidence base in the Bhagavadgītā (2.32, 4.22) and ignores the focus
on duties central to Kṛṣṇa’s advice to Arjuna (3.19, 18.9), to better understand the role
of chance in decision-making and desireless action, the prisoner’s dilemma warrants
consideration. However, this is not the only, or even the main, reason why the dilemma
is worth considering. Most importantly, the dilemma reveals the rationality of striving
to advance the common good, i.e., seeing one’s own well-being as connected to the
larger well-being of society and of fellow human beings. As was seen, this is a
prominent teaching in the Bhagavadgītā.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Formulated in 1950 by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher and later formalized by
Albert Tucker (Peterson 2009; Poundstone 1992), the prisoner’s dilemma is a fictional
story of a decision-making situation in which individuals seeking their own benefit
each end up with a worse outcome than what they could have achieved by cooperating.
Used to demonstrating decision-making in the face of risk and uncertainty, the dilemma
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has inspired numerous discussions and various analyses among game and decision
theorists.
In the story, John and Mary, the accomplices to a crime, have been apprehended and
threatened with imprisonment for their wrongdoing. Because neither is able to com-
municate with the other, they can remain silent or they can expose each other. If both
remain silent, then each will receive a 1-year prison sentence. However, if one of them
confesses, then he or she will go free while the accomplice is jailed for three years. If
both confess, then each will receive a 2-year sentence. Furthermore, both of them are
aware of the consequences of all three options (cf. Peterson 2009).
The true dilemma of the situation is that, whatever one chooses, the other had better
confess, even though the common good would be for both of them to remain silent.
Written as two Nash equilibria, the dilemma implies that neither prisoner has anything
to gain by changing his or her strategy alone. The situation can be conceived as shown
in Table 1, in which the left-hand number indicates the prison sentence, in years that
John will receive, whereas the right-hand number indicates the sentence, also in years
that Mary will receive. If both accomplices confess, then the sentence for each will be 2
years; however, if both remain silent, then each will receive a sentence of only a year.
If John remains silent, then Mary will be sentenced to a year in prison if she also
remains silent. However, if Mary exposes John, then she will be set free. In another
scenario, if John snitches on Mary, then Mary, if she remains silent, will be sentenced
to three years but, if she confesses, only to two. Thus, the prisoner who acts in the
interest of his or her best interest would snitch on the other and thereby ensure a shorter
sentence for him- or herself, instead of remaining silent and inevitably receiving a
sentence. Although John and Mary would act rationally by seeking his or her own best
benefit, as a twosome, they face a worse outcome by acting selfishly than they would
by cooperating (Myerson 1991; Peterson 2009).
The collectively suboptimal outcome depends on either the absence of an enforce-
able agreement or intrinsic trust between the prisoners and a lack of information about
each other’s intentions. Rationality and self-interest would force each prisoner to betray
the other and thus choose an outcome worse for both of them than the outcome
afforded were they to cooperate and thereby minimize their total number of years in
prison. The dilemma showcases that what is optimal for each risk-averse individual
needs not coincide with what is collectively optimal (Peterson 2009). As mentioned,
the prisoner’s dilemma also presents and illuminates the two basic strategies of
decision-making: focusing on self-interest versus pursuing the greater good.
Moreover, it suggests that those strategies are not necessarily associated, which is
exactly what Kṛṣṇa indicates in the Bhagavadgītā when he warns against acting for
personal gain (2.47–48, 6.1).
Table 1 Strategies and outcomes available to John and Mary in the prisoner’s dilemma
Mary confesses Mary remains silent
John confesses 2, 2 0, 3
John remains silent 3, 0 1, 1
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Of course, it is possible to defend an even more altruistic perspective on the core of
the prisoner’s dilemma. According to that perspective, the only genuinely altruistic
strategy to achieve the combination of a short sentence and help one’s accomplice is to
remain silent, even when faced with the risk that the accomplice may confess. After all,
altruism requires accepting the risk that one’s self-interest might remain unfulfilled.
From the alternative perspective of moral theory, both act utilitarians as well as rule
utilitarians would theoretically support the view that both prisoners should remain silent
because, by doing so, the greatest good for the greatest number would be achieved in
the particular case (i.e., act utilitarianism) and in general (i.e., rule utilitarianism),
provided that no one other than John and Mary are involved. Kantian deontologists,
by extension, would likely argue that both prisoners ought to tell the truth and confess,
because telling the truth is a duty, Kant says, and not an action to be performed on a
case-by-case basis (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:389, 4:403, 4:441;
Kant 2002, 5, 19, 58–59). That said, an arbitrary but nevertheless notable feature of the
dilemma concerns prisoners’ liability to confess and remain silent. Even without a pro
tanto or prima facie duty to tell the truth and despite prison being the story’s context,
the prisoner’s dilemma is more deeply about the conflict between individual benefit and
mutual advantage (Weirich 2015).
In the prisoner’s dilemma, a prisoner who wants to follow the principle of desireless
action would theoretically follow one of two decision-making strategies: be indifferent
and leave the decision to chance (e.g., by arbitrarily drawing lots) or either pursue the
common good or the other prisoner’s benefit (e.g., by remaining silent) instead of
seeking to benefit him- or herself (e.g., by snitching). Not only is the second strategy
ethically more appropriate, but it also follows Kṛṣṇa’s advice in the Gītā, at least
assuming that individuals who want to act without desire (i.e., followers of
niṣkāmakarma) can be goal-oriented, pursue unselfish goals, and remain both
indifferent and uncommitted to personal benefit. Readers such as Chuang (2015) have
espoused that interpretation of Kṛṣṇa’s advice and dubbed it ‘benevolent action’. I
agree with this interpretation and aim to expand upon it by suggesting, below, a
particular understanding of Sreekumar’s (2012) argument that the Bhagavadgītā ad-
vances consequentialist ethics. In contrast, Framarin (2009) has effectively
problematized prioritizing unselfish desires. He has observed that contemporary readers
almost unanimously contend that, since all action is motivated by desire, desireless
action is an oxymoron; consequently such action is performed without selfish desire,
meaning that unselfish desire is permissible. Framarin has also pointed out, however,
that arguments for that view are unconvincing, since the doctrine of desireless action
should be taken literally: as advice not to act without any desire at all (Chakrabarti
1983). Following such a doctrine would require people to act as automatons without
wanting or waiting for anything before acting, which, from a psychological standpoint
and based on the text evidence in the Bhagavadgītā, is a highly unintuitive and
implausible perspective. Therefore, I think that Framarin’s argument is not convincing.
According to a common view, the Bhagavadgītā advances duty-based ethics
through the mouth of Kṛṣṇa, whereas Arjuna appeals to consequentialist considerations.
This view is represented, for example, by Sen (2009, pp. 23–24, 208–217), who
emphasizes that the Bhagavadgītā should been seen as a classic debate between
deontological and consequential ethics. Contrary to this view, Sreekumar (2012, pp.
278, 299–300, 303–310) argues that the Bhagavadgītā advances consequentialism
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rather than duty-based ethics. Sreekumar forcefully defends the view that Krishna’s
ethical thinking is a distinctive kind of rule-consequentialism that takes as intrinsically
valuable the twin consequences of liberation (mokṣa) and the common good
(lokasaṅgraha). According to Sreekumar (2012, p. 301), the core of the doctrine of
niṣkāmakarma is that the agent must detach himself or herself from all those conse-
quences of action that redound directly or indirectly to his or her personal advantage,
egoistically considered. I agree with Sreekumar.
The discussed interpretations of Kṛṣṇa’s advice are listed in Table 2.
Four of these interpretations are relevant based on the text evidence in the
Bhagavadgītā. The relevant interpretations are 1, 2, 3, and 5. Interpretation 1 is the
most traditional, while interpretation 2 is supported both by the text evidence in the
Gītā and by the prisoner’s dilemma. Interpretation 3 is a kind of onto-epistemological
extension of both interpretations 1 and 2: a right understanding of the true self involves
selfless dutifulness and serving the common good. Interpretation 5 directs the attention
to the actual performance of the deed rather than to the result of the deed, which can be
matched both with interpretations 1 and 2. The compatibility of interpretations 1 and 2
requires that contributing to the common good is understood as an absolute duty.
Moreover, even though interpretation 5 rejects the result of action as the focus of the
agent, it does not prevent the agent from focusing on the consequences of his or her
action. This represents a consequentialist argument compatible with interpretation 2.
Interpretations 4 and 6 are more or less irrelevant for the Bhagavadgītā and therefore
are not discussed further.
Sreekumar (2012, p. 307, n. 75) argues that no ethical theory can be both deonto-
logical and consequentialist. However, he adds that an ethical theory can be rule-
consequentialist. What often remains unobserved—and this also pertains to
Sreekumar’s view—is that different rule-based accounts of ethics, like consequential-
ism and deontological ethics, can be, and in everyday life often are, integrated in a
hierarchical order and are used simultaneously for different purposes, such as moral
evaluation and education, encouragement, and disapproval. The levels of a norm-
hierarchy can be expressed as definitory rules and strategic rules. Definitory rules
define the basic moves, i.e., what is and what is not admissible in the game, and
strategic rules explain how to play the game (Hintikka 1999, p. 98). Consequentialism
and deontological ethics need not contradict each other in so far as they operate at
different levels of a rule hierarchy, i.e., for different purposes, and approach human
action from different angles. Specifically, these different purposes are to fulfil duties
and responsibilities, on the one hand, and to avoid harms and to pursue benefits, on the
Table 2 Different interpretations of Kṛṣṇa’s advice
1.Perform deeds out of duty.
2.Pursue the common good or the benefit of the other instead of personal benefit.
3.Know and follow the true self, ātman.
4.Be indifferent when choosing among actions and leave the decision to chance, fate or providence.
5.Focus on acting rather than on its outcomes.
6.Perform deeds without taking the trouble to accomplish them.
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other. I want to emphasize that this ‘rules of different levels’ interpretation is not a
magic trick that would eliminate the major difference between consequentialism and
deontological ethics, namely that in deontological ethics the justification of moral
duties is independent of the consequences of performing them, while in consequential-
ism the moral duties are justified in terms of the good consequences that the perfor-
mance of those duties will have. The ‘rules of different levels’ concept also provides a
solution to the dilemma mentioned in the beginning of this essay: The striving for
liberation is the definitory goal while renouncing desires is a strategic mean to reach
that goal. The fundamental difference between consequentialism and deontological
ethics is thus admitted, but it must be added that this difference does not prevent a
certain kind of reconciliation: The rules of different levels (i.e., the level of definitory
rules and the level of strategic rules) can be coordinated such that deontological duties
limit consequentialist duties. For example, the fundamental human rights and related
prohibitions of punishing the innocent and mistreating anyone limit the utilitarian use
of punishment as a deterrent and regulate the treatment of minorities. Moreover,
consequentialism and deontological ethics often require the same action but for differ-
ent reasons. For example, telling the truth and keeping one’s promises are plausible
deontological requirements as well as the necessary conditions for viable societies and
economies. Thus, the same rule such as ‘one should tell the truth’ or ‘one should keep
one’s promises’ can be arrived at in different ways and from different reasons and has
been conceived from different perspectives by deontologists and consequentialists
alike.
One may consider it natural that the definitory rules of ethics are deontological while
strategic rules can be consequentialist: Deontological ethics defines actions that are
permitted or absolutely required or prohibited, while consequentialism defines how to
maximize the benefit or to minimize the suffering. One can add that the role of strategic
rules is suitable for deontological ethics that does not provide goals for human life but
rules for any situation. However, also in regard to the maximizing of benefit and
minimizing of harm, actions are allowed only if they are required or permitted by
definitory rules. Referring to Sreekumar’s interpretation of the Bhagavadgītā, seeking
for liberation is a consequentialist goal whose realization requires that the duty to
contribute to the common good is met (Sreekumar 2012, 308, 309). Thus, one can
conclude that in the Gītā, definitory rules of the ‘game of life’ are consequentialist (e.g.,
the rule that liberation is to be sought), while strategic rules can be both deontological
(e.g., the rule that liberation requires fulfilling universal moral obligations) and conse-
quentialist (e.g., the rule that liberation requires doing one’s professional responsibil-
ities, like the duties of a soldier, and contributing to the common good).
To sum the above discussion, the desirelessness of an action, in the context of the
prisoner’s dilemma, has to be addressed in relation to the following options:
A. Acting out of self-interest (i.e., in opposition to the common good) and thereby
either maximizing one’s personal benefit or minimizing harm to oneself; or
B. Acting collaboratively (i.e., generously towards others) or altruistically (i.e., be-
nevolently and with concern for the wellbeing of others) and thereby maximizing
either the collective benefit or the benefit of others.
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Confessing and remaining silent are the concrete actions by which those options can be
realized in the prisoner’s dilemma. An indicator of indifference, by contrast, would be
that neither of the given options is considered to be eligible and that neither is sought.
According to the first interpretation of niṣkāmakarma in light of the prisoner’s
dilemma, action without desire means that one’s personal benefit, the collective benefit,
and the benefit of others are not goals. However, if the choice has to be made, then an
indifferent means or one free of desire is to either draw lots or leave the decision to
chance. Clearly, neither the Bhagavadgītā nor the principle of niṣkāmakarma recom-
mends making decisions of human action by resorting to chance. Thus, the
Bhagavadgītā does not recommend the freedom of indifference or arbitrary random-
ness but exhorts people to act according to duty (3.19, 18.9).
The question remains, however, whether another way for an action to be desireless is
possible. In response, with reference to the principle of niṣkāmakarma, people should
choose the second option and act collaboratively and altruistically (i.e., with concern
for the wellbeing of others) instead of acting out of self-interest. Such an answer means
that, even if people should not aim to receive the fruits of their actions for themselves,
they should at least aim for the common good and the benefit of and positive
consequences for others. Advice from chapter 3 of the Bhagavadgītā reiterates that
answer clearly: ‘Even considering only the world’s welfare, you ought to act’ (3.20;
Feuerstein 2014, p. 125) and ‘the wise should act thus unattached, desiring to accom-
plish the world’s welfare’ (3.25; Feuerstein 2014, p. 127). In terms of options listed in
Table 2, the solution approximates what is known as ‘benevolent action’ (option 2)
(Chuang 2015).
Nevertheless, it is still doubtful whether an altruistic or collaborative motive for
action truly represents desireless or disinterested action. One answer is that it depends
on the point of view. From a moral point of view, an altruistic action is arguably
desireless, because, by definition, it is not based on a desire for one’s personal benefit.
However, all action requires intention, as Davidson (1980) has pointed out, and
altruistic or collaborative action is no exception. If one’s intention is to maximize the
collective benefit or the benefit of another, and if the person knows which results or
end-state could make his or her intention true, then he or she intends to perform an
action that is not desireless—at least not in any absolute sense—but deliberate and
purposeful. This is an example of the danger of adopting the term niṣkāmakarma as
shorthand for the central teaching of the Bhagavadgītā, when in fact it is not used in the
text.
Gauthier (1986) has presented the following solution to the prisoner’s dilemma: that
when the dilemma is iterated, or repeated for numerous rounds with the same people,
such that the prisoners come to know the other person and his or her likely decision,
then it is rational for both prisoners to cooperate, as long as each thinks that he or she is
dealing with a cooperatively minded person. Otherwise, it is rational to pursue a non-
cooperative strategy. Therefore, one must trust in the other’s inclination to cooperate.
Such trust can be achieved either by one’s observations of the other person’s behavior
in repeated decision-making situations or by other people’s testimony of the person.
Gauthier has articulated that claim by distinguishing two kinds of utility-maximizing
individuals: straightforward maximizers, who always seek their self-interest and refuse
to cooperate, and constrained maximizers, who cooperate with fellow constrained
maximizers but not with straightforward ones. Moreover, Gauthier has argued that
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individuals will choose to dispose themselves as constrained maximizers instead of
straightforward ones—that is, to re-train themselves not to think of their self-interest
first but instead dispose themselves to honor their agreements if they find themselves in
an environment of like-minded individuals (Gauthier 1986; Peterson 2009).
Applying the principle of niṣkāmakarma to Gauthier’s solution yields a different
interpretation of the prisoner’s dilemma: that both prisoners should follow the principle
of niṣkāmakarma. In Gauthier’s terminology, such people are constrained maximizers
because they want to maximize the common good but do not aim to maximize their
individual benefits. However, that interpretation must be made with a certain reserva-
tion. One may suggest that people who follow the principle of niṣkāmakarma should
cooperate with all persons, including straightforward maximizers or those who do not
follow the principle, rather than only with like-minded people (i.e., fellow-constrained
maximizers). After all, only then will the followers of niṣkāmakarma truly heed
Kṛṣṇa’s advice to not expect any selfish results. Thus, according to this interpretation,
the followers of niṣkāmakarma should be ready to accept that they can be ruthlessly
exploited by straightforward maximizers. However, in the Bhagavadgītā, Kṛṣṇa rec-
ommends nothing like submissiveness or passive behavior, not even when such
behavior would help to avoid a war and would save people’s lives. In fact, it is just
the opposite (e.g., 2.37, 18.59). Therefore, and taking into account that the definitory
rules of the ‘game of life’ are consequentialist in the Gītā, it can be concluded that the
followers of niṣkāmakarma should cooperate only with like-minded people because
only in that way can the common good be advanced.
Conclusion
This paper has discussed the Bhagavadgītā’s doctrine of niṣkāmakarma, or altruistic action,
performed without expectation of reward. In the Bhagavadgītā, Kṛṣṇa proclaims that
humans have rights only to actions and not to their results, whether good or bad (2.47).
Therefore, humans should not desire any results whatsoever. Having distinguished interpre-
tations of Kṛṣṇa’s advice and referred to textual evidence, the paper has concluded that the
idea that people have rights only to actions and not to their results should be interpreted
either as the obligation to act selflessly contributing to the common good or as the wisdom to
focus on acting rather than its outcomes. The prisoner’s dilemma reveals that, of those two
interpretations, the interpretation prioritizing the common good is more advantageous than
the alternative because it maximizes the collective benefit.
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